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1 Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
RUSSELL S. STICKLE, ~ 
Plaintiff and AppeUant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7831 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Italics ours) 
At the close of all the evidence in this case the court 
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, it having 
been urged in support thereof that the evidence as a matter 
of law disclosed the contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
and failed as a matter of law to make a jury question on 
the negligence of the defendant (Tr. 98, 99). 
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Surely it is unnecessary to brief for this court the i.d:: 
law governing the trial court's exercise of its power to;.;.;.;.;.;. 
direct a verdict. We take no issue with appellant thereon.;::::: 
We also believe that the law establishing the duty and:::::: 
limiting the duty of a delivering carrier to a consignee ; 
with respect to the condition of a railroad car and its 
lading is well settled and subject to little if any dispute. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
The question of whether the trial court erred or not in;;;;;;: 
directing a verdict in this case obviously requires the test- 1 i i 
ing of the facts disclosed by the record against the simple , , , , _ .
principles of law referred to. As it appears to us that this .. 
court must dispose of the appeal in such fashion, a detailed, ..... .. 
accurate and com.plete statement of the facts is essential ..... .. 
if the briefs are to be helpful. We consider the statement 
of facts in appellant's brief wholly inadequate to assist 
the court and respectfully submit the following exposition 
thereof, with supporting references to the record. At the 
outs.et a statement of the controlling legal principles seems 
appropriate. 
First, in a case of this kind, if the plaintiff was him-
self guilty of negligence pro~imately contributing to the 
accident causing his injuries, it is a complete bar to re-
covery. If the evidence of plaintiff's own negligence is 
such that the minds of reasonable men could not differ 
thereon, the trial court should direct a verdict in favor of 
the defendant. It should be noted that this is not a case 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the plaintiff 
was not an employe of the defendant. 
Second, the defendant as a delivering carrier owes a 
duty to a consignee and to a consignee's employes to make 
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3 
a reasonable inspection of the car to be delivered, and its · 
~ lading, and to discover any defects in the car or the lading 
~· which are discoverable upon a reasonable inspection and 
1 which might cause injury to one in the process of unload-
~ ing the car wh·ile s·u.ch person was exercising due care for 
.,I 
· his own safety. The duty of a delivering carrier upon dis-
covery of such a defect as might cause injury to one exer-
- cising due care for his own safety during the process of 
:J unloading, is to repair the defect or give notice to the con-
signee. Either to repair or give notice. The delivering 
carrier's duty is discharged by repairing or giving notice 
after they have discovered the defect. (Authorities here-
inafter cited.) 
The plaintiff, 33 years of age, was employed by the 
construction firm of Rademann-Guisto Co. of Oakland, CaJ-
ifornia, which firm had a contract with the ·Pacific Fruit 
Express Company for the erection of a plant at Pocatello, 
Idaho (Tr. 1, 2, 3). The defendant .railroad delivered a 
flatcar to the plaintiff's employer loaded with two large 
steel tanks, and plaintiff was injured while assisting in 
the unloading thereof. The accident occurred December 
7, 1949, and plaintiff brought suit against the defendant 
Union Pacific Railroad Company August 28, 1951, some 
twenty months later. 
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the· de-
fendant was negligent in that (a) defendant failed to in-
spect the car and lading before delivery; (b) defendant 
negligently inspected the car and lading and failed to dis-
cover the broken tie band on the tank; (c) defendant neg-
ligently spotted the car for unloading when it knew, or 
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should have known, that the car was in an unsafe condi-
• • UUUUUIU 
t1on for unloading (Tr. 2, 3). The defendant In answer 
. ::::q·r:mil 
denied the foregoing and pleaded affirmatively, assumption ,,,,, )j 
i; i i ~· ~· J' J' J' J' J' J'l 
of risk and negligence of the plaintiff himself proximately-······················ 
I ll\l\11•:·:·:·:·;; 
contributing to cause his injuries (Tr. 6, 7, 8). A'ssumption ,,, ....... 
of risk was not argued by the defendant as a basis for its 
motion for a directed verdict. 
The car in question had been loaded on the Southern ,,,,, ........ 
Pacific Company lines at Oakland, California, and routed , 
Southern Pacific to Ogden, Utah, Union Pacific to Poca- .......... .. 
tello, Idaho. It was a flatcar loaded with two steel tanks 
of equal size, approximately 10 feet in diameter, 20 feet 
in length, occupying practically the entire flatcar when 
laid lengthwise, end to end. (Defendant's Exhibits 3, 4, 
and Tr. 4). These tanks fit snugly in wooden cradles and 
were held in place by steel bands approximately 21/2 to 3112 
inches in width and 1/16 to 3/32 of an inch in thickness. 
The bands used on the car were 1f2 to 1 inch wider than the 
sample in evidence (Tr. 35, 59, and Defendant's Exhibit 5). 
These tie bands, as they are referred to, passed over the 
top . of the tanks and through the stake pockets in the bed 
of the flatcar, the ends being then laid back against the 
strap and fastened with clamps by a machine·. Each tank 
was held by two of such bands which were located 3 or 4 
feet from the end of each tank (Tr. 4, 6, 7, 23). All of the 
witnesses on both sides testified that this was the custo-
mary way for loading and securing such tanks for shipment 
by rail. When the car arrived at Pocatello it was subjected 
to the regular inspection given all cars at that point whether 
they are to be delivered to a consignee in the City of Poca-
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tello or are to continue on to some other destination. The 
car, as will be seen from defendant's Exhibits 3 and 4-
" the same being freight waybills-was Southern 51595. When 
~~ inspected by the defendant railroad upon arrival the broken 
, tie band was discovered and noted by defendant's witness 
'I 
, George_ S. Cutler, who was the lead car inspector at Poca-
tello at that time, and a record thereof made (Defendant's 
Exhibit 1). This record is the American Association of 
, Railroads original record of inspection required by all mem-
ber railroads to be preserved. The record is made only on 
those cars on which defects are noted (Tr. 72, 86). At the 
time of the inspection a placard or bad order card, similar 
to defendant's Exhibit 2, was stapled with an automatic 
stapling hammer on the side of the bed of the flatcar and 
the specific defect "broken tie band" was indicated thereon 
(Tr. 72, 73). No other placard or notice is placed on or 
sent along with the car upon delivery (Tr. 79, 80). The 
witness George S. Cutler testified- that it was, and , had 
been for the 27 years he had worked as a car inspector for 
the defendant company in its yards at Pocatello, the custom 
and practice to card cars in such manner and if the car 
and its load was safe for transportation, to deliver the same 
to the local consignee, so carded ( Tr. 73, 7 4 . Of course, 
if the car was not consigned to a local consignee it would 
go to the rip track for repairs before· it went out on the 
main line again. If it was not safe for transportation to a 
local consignee, it would be made safe before delivery. The 
defendant's witness Alfred W. Peters, General Car Fore-
man at Pocatello with 32 years experience in the car de-
partment, corroborated the witness Cutler in the foregoing 
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(Tr. 86, 87, 89, 90). As to the custom and practice of iii!: 
placing a bad order tag on a car safe for transportation , , , , , 
but having some other defect and then delivering it to a 
·i .< ; 
local consignee, the witness Peters testified that it was the ~ ~,,. 
same at Ogden, Utah, and Cheyenne, Wyoming, where he , , ', · 
"' ~ 1 -t; "' 
had also worked for defendant as a car inspector. The car · · ·· 
inspected was delivered to the construction area where the · · 
plaintiff was working shortly after the inspection and ·· ·· · · 
spotted on an industry track running north and south. 
The plaintiff was working with a gang of five exper-
ienced steel workers, including the foreman, Don Evans, 
I who testified on behalf of the plaintiff. All of the gang 
were experienced steel men (Tr. 38), the foreman having 
had 12 years experience in steel ( Tr. 44) , and the plaintiff 
himself having had approximately 12 years experience as 
a steel worker ( Tr. 2) . They started preparing to unload 
the tanks at approximately 12:30 P. M. December 7, 1949, 
and these five men, including the plaintiff Stickle, worked 
about the car preparing cribbing and moving up a crane 
wit~ which to lift the tanks off· the car and performing 
other preliminary tasks for somewhere between thirty min-
utes and one hour before the plaintiff Stickle was injured 
(Tr. 34, 35). During the preparation for unloading the 
tank the plaintiff himself cut the south tie band on the 
southerly of the two tanks on the car. The car was standing 
on a track running north and south and this band was cut 
on the east side (Tr. 7). The crane which was to be used 
in lifting the tank off the car was to be moved up on the 
west side of the car and plaintiff testified that someone 
had to go on top of the tank to hook the crane (plaintiff's 
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testimony Tr. 7). He then testified, "So I grabbed ahold 
of the metal band and proceeded to crawl up. I got just 
about on top when it broke on the other side" (Tr. 7). 
Pressed by his counsel as to whether or not he did any 
"testing" to see whether or not the strap would hold him 
before he went up, he testified: "I just put my weight on 
it to see if it would hold is all." He also testified that 
while it is a common practice to cut a tie band and use 
it much as one would a rope to pull himself up on top of 
the car (Tr. 7), it was also customary for the man who 
was going on top of the tank to go up the boom of the crane 
and thus reach the place on top of the tank where he would 
fasten the chains or cables to be used in unloading (Tr. 
26). His foreman, Don Evans, testified that the work was 
not always done by a man pulling himself up by the tie 
band, as now contended for by appellant, but was also per-
formed by a man riding the crane up. 
Questions by Mr. Roberts: 
· "Q. Now is there a custom and practice with 
relation to the manner in which these cars are un-
loaded that have the things on them that this car 
did? 
"A. Oh, generally, yes. 
"Q. And what is that custom and practice? 
"A. Well, you cut your car loose and get your 
crane in there to hook on to it and take it off. 
"Q. Well, what is it with relation to going up 
the side of the tank? 
"A. Well, the way, the general practice is either 
that, climbing up the side, or riding the crane up. 
"Q. One or the other is the way it is done? 
"A. Yes" (Tr. 45). 
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A crane was being moved up to the car at the time 
plaintiff fell, and the tanks were finally removed by use 
of the crane ( Tr. 4, 39, 40). 
The plaintiff testified that in his experience the tanks 
in question were loaded in the customary manner (Tr. 21) ; 
that he had worked all over the United States as a steel 
worker, and had assisted in· unloading approximately 50 
to 75 similar loads and had personally gone on top of such 
loads 20 to 30 times (Tr. 5, 30) . 
The tie band which broke and permitted the plaintiff 
to fall was, by the testimony of the plaintiff and his wit-
ness the foreman, Don Evans, fractured in such a fashion 
that before the plaintiff endeavored to pull himself up 
thereby less than 1;4 of an inch of metal was holding the 
strap together on the west side of the car. It broke near 
the point where it entered the stake pocket on the west 
side of the car. Both the plaintiff and his foreman testified 
that it was an old break and that after the plaintiff had 
fallen they examined the fracture and found the break 
to be weathered and rusty, with the exception of a break 
of less than 1;4 of an inch in length on one edge of the 
strap which showed bright ·metal (Tr. 29, 31, 32, 46). 
Neither the plaintiff nor his foreman made any examina-
tion or inspection whatsoever of the car or its. lading or 
the tie band to determine whether the clamps on the west 
side had loosened, whether the band .was broken or had 
become detached from the west side of the car, or in any 
other way had become unsuitable for the use to which the 
plaintiff Stickle knew he was going to put it when he cut 
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it on the east side of the car with the intention of using 
it to climb with. The break in the tie band was such that 
it was readily observable. The plaintiff Stickle told his 
counsel Mr. Roberts on direct examination that if he had 
gone over on the west side of the car and examined the 
tie band he could have seen that it was broken (Tr. 8). 
On cross-examination he again admitted that the break 
could have been readily observed had he or anyone on the 
gang looked (Tr. 35). The foreman Evans also testified 
on cross-examination as to the nature of the break as 
follows: 
Questions by Mr. Bronson : 
"Q. And you didn't inspect it, is that right? 
"A. N o. 
"Q. And none of your men inspected it? 
"A. N 0. 
"Q. And Mr. Sickle didn't inspect it? 
"A. No, I don't think ~o. 
"Q. And yet the break in that band was such, 
you have told us, that it was readily ohserved if 
somebody had been inspecting those bands ? 
"A. Yeah, if you had been inspecting them. 
"Q. You could have readily observed that, is 
that right? 
"A. I think so" (Tr. 62). 
Called on rebuttal by the plaintiff he was asked on cross-
examination: 
"Q. You didn't make any inspection of the ·car, 
did you? 
"A. No particular inspection" (Tr. 96). 
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The plaintiff Stickle was also called on rebuttal and again 
testified, as he had on direct, as follows: 
"Q. And even without a bad order card tacked 
on the car had you been inspecting the car, observ-
. ing this band that you were going to use to pull your-
self up with, you could have seen that it was broken, 
is that right? 
"A. Yes sir, that's. right" ( Tr. 98) . 
Both the plaintiff Stickle and- his witness the Foreman 
Evans testified that in their work they were familiar with 
bad order cards being placed upon railroad cars which they 
had in the past unloaded. 'rhey both testified that they 
would not proceed to unload a car which was placarded as 
bad ordered for some defect until they had made a check 
of the car and ascertained whether or not it was safe to 
do so ( Tr. 96, 97) . Yet they did not examine the car for 
a bad order card or anything else. They both testified that 
they did not notice a bad order card- on the car in question, 
but it was obvious that they did not look, and they both 
admitted on cross-examination that they made no exam-
ination or inspection of the car. The plaintiff Stickle him-
self testified on cross-examination as follows: 
Mr. Bronson: 
"Q. You have seen those (referring to had or-
der cards) sticking on cars, haven't you? You didn't 
observe anything like that on this car? 
"A. No, I didn't. 
"Q. Of course you didn't make any inspection 
of the car? 
"A. None whatsoever'' (Tr. 39). 
This, in spite of the fact that by the testimony of the plain-
tiff himself, he and his foreman and the rest of the gang 
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had been around and about the car for from 30 minutes to 
one hour prior to the time he was injured preparing it for 
unloading. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT 
TO A JURY TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF T'HE 
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE AUT'HOR-
ITIES. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLD-
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
INTRODUCED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT FAILED TO RE-
PAIR OR TO GIVE WARNING OF THE BROK-
EN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO WOULD 
UNLOAD THE TANKS FROM THE FLATCAR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. · 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT 
TO A JURY TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICAB.LE AUTHOR-
ITIES. 
In connection with this point appellant urges upon 
this court the proposition that the question of contributory 
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negligence is for. the jury where the evidence and the in-
ferences to be deduced therefrom are such that reasonable 
men might arrive at different conclusions, citing four or 
five authorities from this court in support thereof. We are 
at a loss. to understand why such an elementary and funda-
mental proposition of law should be briefed for this court. 
This case is not one under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act and the conception of negligence as laid down by the 
Supreme Court of the United States under such act should 
not be extended to all other cases in the law, particularly 
where as here it is not a suit by an ·employe against his 
employer. Not only in this connection but in connection 
with appellant's brief as a whole it might be well to refer 
to the statement of Mr. Justice Wolfe in the case of Eugene 
W. Raymond v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,' 113 Utah 
26, 191 P. 2d 137, which involved the same defendant and 
the same counsel. It was another suit by an employe· of 
a consignee, who, in total disregard of every reasonable, 
sensible measure .for his own safety, was injured on a car 
which this defendant had delivered to his employer. After 
·receiving full compensation under the appropriate act he 
brought suit against this defendant and was nonsuited be-
cause of his contributory negligence, which judgment was 
affirmed. This court with respect to "Point I" said: 
"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff 
that this decision has deprived him, of his constitu ... 
tional right to a jury trial. That contention has been 
urged upon this court in almost ·every case of non-
suit and directed verdict brought before us. This 
court is charged with the duty of protecting all of 
the rights of all litigants. This is especially true of 
those fundamental rights guaranteed by the State 
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and Federal Constitutions. But the right to have a 
jury pass upon issues of fact does not include the 
right to have a cause submitted to a jury in the hope 
of a verdict where the facts undisputably show that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLD-
, 
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTO-RY NEGLIGENCE AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW. 
After defendant's motion for a directed verdict was 
made and the court had listened to arguments thereon, the 
trial judge took the matter unde·r advisement until the 
following morning. When the jury returned the following 
morning the judge, having determined that he should di-
rect a verdict, spent some 10 or 15 minutes speaking some-
what informally to the jury in connection with his. dis-
missing them from further. service in the case (Tr. 101-
103). In following this highly comm-endable practice, which 
is no more than a display of good manners and judicial 
courtesy on the part of the trial judge toward the jury, 
it is doubtful that the trial court considered he was de-
livering a technical oral legal opinion which would be sub-
jected to what we consider the rather captious criticism 
now made by appellant's counsel. The trial judge did. make 
the unfortunate statement attributed to him by appellant's 
counsel on page 11 ·of his brief, which statement of the law 
is unquestionably erroneous. Appellant's counsel says that 
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the trial judge, "Took the utterly defenseless position that 
the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to free himself 
from contributory negligence", and "Apparently * * * 
had the idea that it was incumbent upon plaintiff to estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not 
guilty of contributory negligence." Appellant's counsel on 
numerous occasions in the past, when we were also present 
as counsel for the defendant, has heard the Honorable Ray 
Van Cott, Jr. instruct the jury that the defendant has the 
burden of proving contributory negligence of the plaintiff, 
and must prove it to the satisfaction of the jury by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Charging the trial court 
in this instance with ignorance of such an elementary and 
basic principle in the trial of personal injury suits seems 
particularly unwarranted in view of the fact that Judge 
Van Cott, prior to the time he made the unfortunate state-
ment referred to and early in his talk to the jury, said: 
"The doctrine and well-settled law is that if a person is 
himself guilty of negligence which contributes to his own 
injury, that fact is fatal to his righ~ to recover against 
somebody else, and it is on that basis that I have determined 
as a matter of law and without any question of fact that 
the plaintiff ought not to be permitted to recover against 
the railroad in this instance" (Tr. 101, 102). "The evidence 
in this case ·shows; by the plaintiff himself, that had he 
walked around and looked at this strap that he was about 
to use as a ladder to climb up this side of this tank that 
he would have seen that the strap was torn and that it 
probably was not safe" (Tr. 101). The court did not pur-
port· to discuss "burden of proof", "preponderance of the 
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evidence", or the rules of law governing the direction of a 
verdict in any technical sense. Only desperation over a 
cause without merit can account for counsel grasping at 
this straw. 
This court must examine the facts in the record and 
from the record alone determine whether or not there is 
any substantial conflict in the evidence on contributory neg-
ligence which would warrant submitting the case to the 
jury and whether or not there is any substantial evidence 
of the defendant's negligence which would warrant sub-
mitting the case to the jury. There may be situations where 
the court itself is deciding a question of fact and where the 
record discloses that because of a misconception of the law 
the court reached such a dubious result as· warrants re-
versal. An example might be where the court found a 
defendant guilty of a criminal offense by a misapplication 
of law to an undisputed set of facts. But that is not this 
case, and even though it be ridiculously assumed that Judge 
Van Cott did not understand the law, it does not change 
the facts in this record upon which the case must be af-
firmed or reversed. 
Turning now to the facts in the record bearing upon 
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, there is but one 
suggestion made for submitting the case to the jury, viz: 
that the plaintiff put his weight on the tie band as he 
started to climb the same and thus "tested it". The appel-
lant does not mention one single piece of evid~nce in the 
entire record which would indicate that the plaintiff ex-
ercised any care for his own safety, for the simple reason 
that there is no evidence in the record that he did so. On 
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the contrary, both he and his foreman admitted in their 
testimony that they did nothing whatsoever to ascertain 
whether or not it wfos safe to use the tie band in the man-
ner it was used. The entire testimony which counsel says 
raises an· issue of fact that warrants submitting this case 
to the jury because plaintiff "tested" the strap, appears on 
page 7 of the transcript and is· as follows: 
Questions by Mr. Roberts: 
"Q. All right. Now after you cut through the 
band with this torch then what did you do, please? 
"A. Then the crane was moving over there 
from the other side ; we was going to spot the crane 
on the other side, so someone had to go up on top 
to hook the crane. So I g'rabbed ahold of the metal 
band and proceeded to crawl up. I got just about 
on top when it broke on the other side. 
"Q. Now is there anything you did in connec-
tion with testing this strap before you went up? 
"A. I just put my weight on it to see if it 
would hold is all. 
"Q. And did it? 
"A. It held me, yes" (Tr. 7). 
If the plaintiff had done anything other than, as he said, 
"grabbed ahold of the metal band and proceeded to crawl 
up", it seems to us he would have said so without prompting 
by counsel. Even when prompted by his counsel with the 
leading suggestion that he "tested" the strap, he would 
only say, "I just put my weight on it to see if it would 
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hold is all." Of course the plaintiff could not start climb-
ing the strap without putting his weight thereon before 
his feet were off the bed of the flatcar. It is all too obvious 
that he simply took hold of the metal band and proceeded 
to crawl up. His foreman on direct examination, ques-
tioned by his counsel Mr. Roberts, testified as follows: 
"Q. And did Mr. Stickle start to go up? 
"A. y es. 
"Q. Where were you at the time he did? 
"A. I was standing on the ground, right at the 
side of the car. 
"Q. And will you tell us what you saw? Just 
describe what he did and what happened. 
"A. Well, he come on the car and grabbed 
ahold of the strap and started climbing up. He got 
nearly to the top and it give way and he fell" (Tr. 
46). 
Counsel reiterates again and again in argument that 
the plaintiff "tested" the strap before climbing and that 
this made a question for the jury as to whether or not the 
plaintiff was exercising due care for his own safety. If 
the plaintiff had had the slightest interest in whether or 
not the strap was sufficient to support his weight all he 
would have had to do was to look at it, as the tear in the 
strap was readily apparent as testified to by both the plain-
tiff and his foreman Evans ( Tr. 8, 35, 62, 96, 98). The 
only statement in .the record suggesting that the plaintiff 
"tested" the strap came from his counsel. The plaintiff 
by his own testimony made no examination whatsoever, 
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nor was any , examination made by plaintiff's foreman, of : 
the condition of the car or of the load. On direct examina- , 
tion the plaintiff testified ; 
"Q. Did you see this band from the other side 
of the car, where it had broken? 
"A. Yes. They· went over and got it because 
they wanted to know what was, why it broke and 
they went over and examined it afterwards. 
"Q. When you say, 'they went over' what do 
you mean? 
. "A. They went over and picked it up right 
-where it was laying. I drug it right down to the 
ground with me. 
"Q. You drug it down on your side? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And this particular metal band would be 
which one; the one that broke? 
"A. The one on the south end of the tank. 
"Q. Would you describe for us, please, the 
condition of this band as you observed it there? 
"A. Yes. It was, it had evidently had quite a 
jar some place during the trip and it had broke al-
most in two. There was a fresh tear of less than ·a 
quarter of an inch left and the rest had all rusted 
over, so it had been broken for some time. 
"Q. And as you looked at it there could you 
observe that condition; as you saw it? 
"A. If you had've went over there and exam-
ined it you could have, yes" (Tr. 8). 
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On cross-examination the plaintiff testified: 
Questions by Mr. Bronson: 
"Q. Of course you didn't make any inspection 
of the car? 
''A. None whatsoever" (Tr. 39). 
And further : 
"Q. And even without a bad order card tacked 
on the car had you been inspecting the car, observ-
ing this band that you were going to use to pull 
yourself up with, you could have seen that it was 
broken, is that right? 
"A. Yes sir, that's right" (Tr. 98). 
Plaintiff's foreman Evans testified on cross-examination, 
referring to the car : 
"Q. And you didn't inspect it, is that right? 
"A. N o. 
"Q. And none of your men inspected it? 
"A. No. 
"Q. And Mr. Stickle didn't inspect it? 
"A. No, I don't think so. 
"Q. And yet the break in that band was such, 
you have told us, that it was readily observed if 
somebody had been inspecting those bands? 
"A. Yeah, if you had been inspecting them. 
"Q. You could have readily observed that, is 
that right? 
"A. I think so" (Tr. 62). 
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The plaintiff and his foreman were both experienced · · · · 
steel men, the plaintiff having worked all over the United ::::: 
States in steel for approximately 12 years. He had assisted 
in the unloading of 50 to 75 similar tanks from flatcars 
and had personally gone on top of such tanks 20 to 30 times 
( Tr. 5, 30). The plaintiff and his foreman and the rest 
of the gang, all experienced steel men, had spent between 
thirty minutes and one hour about the car preparing it for 
unloading prior to the time the plaintiff was injured (Tr. · · · 
34, 35) . The plaintiff himself used a torch to cut, on the 
east side of the car, the tie band which he used to climb 
on top of the tank with. 
Appellant's counsel contends that because the plaintiff 
and his foreman knew that railroads customarily inspect 
cars before delivering them to a consignee, they had a 
right to asume that the car was in reasonably safe condi-
tion· for unloading. Assuming this to be true, it does not 
relieve plaintiff of all responsibility. The defendant was 
not an insurer of plaintiff's safety. It cannot be contended 
that because the railroad company inspects the car before 
delivery the consignee or his employes are relieved of the 
duty to exercise reasonable care for their own safety. The 
undisputed evidence in this case is that the defendant com-
pany made an inspection of the car and its lading upon 
arrival at Pocatello, discovered the broken tie band, and 
gave notice thereof t6 the consignee. A record the~eof was 
made at the time, which record is required to be preserved 
by· the American Association of Railroads (Defendant's 
Exhibit 1; Tr. 72, 86). Upon discovery of such a defect 
and the making of a permanent record thereof, such as was 
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done in this case, a bad order card (a sample thereof being 
defendant's Exhibit 2) was stapled to the side of the bed 
of the flatcar and written thereon was a reference to the 
specific defect "broken tie band" (Tr. 72, 73). Defendant's 
witness George S. Cutler, the inspector who found the de-
fect and made the record thereof (Defendant's Exhibit 1), 
said that in the light of the records he would say he did 
place such a bad order card on the car (Tr. 72). That he 
had no independent recollection of placing a bad order card 
with the notation "broken tie band" upon the particular 
car in question. Owing to the great lapse of time and the 
many hundreds of cars he had inspected between the date 
of the accident and the date of trial, he could not testify 
otherwise. It is true that both the plaintiff Stickle and 
his foreman Evans testified that they did not observe any 
bad order card on the car, but in view of the fact that they 
made no examination of the car, yet were familiar with 
bad order cards and- recognized the importance of paying 
heed to them when found on cars (Tr. 96, 97), such testi-
mony does not even have the weight of negative evidence. 
Assuming the car did not carry a bad order card, it would 
not relieve plaintiff of exercising due care to avoid injury 
on account of a clearly obvious defect in the load. 
The appellant says at page 11 of his brief that, "Theirs 
was ·not a duty to inspect. Precautions might be expected 
from them as reasonably prudent persons in the perform-
ance of their job." The appellant thus admits that the 
plaintiff was required to exercise reasonable care for his 
own safety. This is all we have ever contended for or now 
contend for on this appeal. The appellant apparently seeks 
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to point out a distinction between the type of inspection 
required to be made by the railroad company and the type 
of inspection or examination which the consignee or his 
employes has a duty to make. That such a distinction exists 
in some types of cases may be admitted. In cases where a 
defect is found to exist in the car itself rather than in the 
load, the consignee, although he observes the defect or is 
warned about it and is nevertheless injured, can under 
some decided cases have the question of his contributory 
negligence submitted to a jury. The question of his con-
tributory negligence under such circumstances does not de-
pend solely upon whether he was warned of the defect or 
observed it himself, but in particular upon the question of 
whether or not he fully appreciated the danger therefrom 
on account of his lack of knowledge er experience with the 
construction and functioning of various parts of railroad 
cars that may be out of order. Many parts of railroad cars 
themselves consist of mechanical contrivances, the function-
ing of which laymen are not entirely familiar with. For 
instance, a dock laborer might observe a defect of some 
kind in a power brake or a car door or be warned by the 
railroad company about such defect and thereafter be in-
jured because he did not fully appreciate the danger in-
herent in such defect. Under such circumstances, it is quite 
proper to submit the question of contributory negligence 
to a jury. In the case at bar it was not a defect in the car 
that caused the injury, but a defect in the load-a defect 
in the tie band holding the tanks on the car. This was a 
condition that the plaintiff and his foreman should have 
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should be required to know in view of the plaintiff's exper-
ience as a steel worker and the large number of similar 
loads he had assisted in unloading. 
Every case that counsel for the appellant has cited to 
this court in support of. the proposition that the plaintiff 
had a right to reply upon the inspection made by the rail-
road company involves situations where there was a defect 
in the car. In !.faker v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 278 
F. 431, 434, cited by appellant, the plaintiff was injured by 
the opera ton of a defective door. He observed its general 
ramshackle condition and certain defects in the door, but 
the court held that in spite of this the question of his con-
tributory negligence should be submitted to the jury for the 
reason that there was still the question of whether or not 
plaintiff as a layman and not a railroad car inspector' fully 
appreciated the dangers that lay in the defects which he 
observed. The court said : 
. 
"He was a merchant, not a car inspector. * * * 
For him to have apprehended the danger it would 
have been necessary for him mentally ·to have fol-
lowed the application of force on the edge of the · 
door, to and through the boards held together only 
at the top, to and through the hanger in its relation 
to rail and canopy, and to have realized the likeli-
hood or possibility of the hanger's being forced from 
the rail as it came to the enlarged space between the 
rail and canopy." 
In other words, the danger from such a condition might be 
readily observable to a railroad car inspector but not to a 
layman and therefore reasonably raise a jury question -on 
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. We submit 
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this case is readily distinguishable from the one at bar 
where the plaintiff himself was the specialist, the expert 
skilled steel man, familiar with unloading similar tanks 
from flatcars loaded in a similar manner. All the other 
cases cited by counsel are of the same pattern and ~ikewise 
not applicable to the facts in the case now before this court. 
In the cited case of Folsom v. Lowden, 157 Kan. 328, 
139 P. 2d 822, the plaintiff, a coal heaver, was unloading 
coal from a gondola which had what is known in railroad 
parlance as a "drop end". This means that the end of the 
gondola is hinged and held in place by latches and may be 
lowered to the bed of the gondola. In this case it was 
warped and sprung. The plaintiff was unfamiliar with the 
construction and operation of a drop end gondola. He was 
unloading coal from the car and when he removed a chunk 
of coal from the end of the car the end fell inward upon 
him and injured his foot. It was quite properly held that 
a jury question was presented on his own contributory 
negligence. 
In Paul v. Georgia Railway & Banking Co., 60 Ga. App. 
461, 4 S. E. 2d 99, the railroad had delivered some cars 
for unloading to the plaintiff's employer. As the cars were 
unloaded they would be moved on the side track with a 
pinch bar and another loaded car moved up to the place 
where the plaintiff and his fellow workmen were unloading. 
After one such car was unloaded and was in the process of 
being moved on the track the adjacent car, containing a 
load, rolled down upon the plaintiff injuring him. The 
railroad company had not set the brake on the car which 
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rolled free and the court held that a complaint setting up 
the facts as thus outlined was not defective as showing 
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a matter of 
law. 
In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Freppon, 134 Ky. 650, 121 
S. W. 454, the plaintiff was injured when he attempted 
to open a car door. He knocked out a pin that was holding 
a defective car door and the court merely held that there 
was a question as to whether or not he knew, or had rea-
sonable grounds to believe, that the car door would fall 
on him when he knocked the pin out. 
The case of Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. v. 
Riddle, 182 Okl. 318, 82 P. 2d 304, is another case cited by 
appellant where the plaintiff was injured by a car door 
that fell on him when he knocked off a cleat that was hold-
ing it in place. Here, as in all t.hese cases, there is a jury 
question as to whether or not the individual plaintiff should 
have, in the light of his experience and knowledge of the 
functioning of various parts of railroad cars, appreciated 
the danger even though he observed the defect. 
The case of Stoutimore v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 
338 Mo. 463, 92 S. W. 2d 658, was one where the plaintiff 
was injured by a defective brake, being knocked thereby 
from the top of a cattle car. The court said: 
"Neither can we sustain defendant's contention 
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. Plaintiff was not a railroad 
man. He was working in the dark with the instru-
mentalities furnished to him by the defendant." 
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The case of Lewis v. ·Southern Pac. Co., (Cal. App.), 
220 P. 2d 431, also cited by appellant, involved a defect in 
the door of the car. The plaintiff could clearly have ob-
served the guides on the door, but nevertheless, he was not 
held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
the court saying : 
"Whether they should, acting as persons of or-
dinary care and prudence, have observed the defec-
tive guides and whether if they had they should with 
their knowledge have realized the danger were prop-
erly questions for the jury." 
An examination of the few cases cited by plaintiff that 
we have not specifically referred to will show that they 
are all cases involving defects to cars and injuries to plain-
tiffs who were warned, or who observed the defect but 
were not sufficiently experienced to fully appreciate the 
danger, and therefore, and only because of this latter qual-
fication, were they held to involve questions for the jury 
on contributory negligence. They are readily distinguish-
able from the case at bar upon two grounds. First, the 
defect here was not a defect in the car, but in the load ; and 
second, it was the type of load that the plaintiff by his own 
testimony was entirely familiar with. In view of his ex-
perience and the greater knowledge that he should have of 
the danger inherent in such a defect as a broken tie band 
than even a railroad car inspector, he is in no position to 
assert that the cited cases apply to and should govern in the 
case at bar. 
Appellant urges that the defendant should be charged 
with knowledge that it was the (!ustom in unloading such 
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tanks for a man to cut a tie band and use it to pull himself 
to the top of the tank and therefore a "special" duty ( al-
though it is not suggested just what) is imposed upon de-
fendant to warn the consignee if a broken tie band is found. 
Of course plaintiff's own evidence was that such method 
was not the customary method; that the work was also done 
by a man "going up the crane" ( Tr. 45) . 
At any rate, to place upon a delivering carrier the 
duty of knowing all the methods that might be employed in 
every case by consignees in unloading the myriad types of 
shipments hauled by rail is ridiculous and fantastic. We 
kriow of no authority that has ever suggested a delivering 
carrier has such a duty and appellant cites none. We do 
not· see how the argument is pertinent to the question of 
contributory negligence in -any event. 
This court in the recent case of Raymond v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 113 Utah 26, 191 P. 2d 137, held, in 
accordance with all the ,authorities upon the matter, that 
an employe of a consignee must exercise ordinary care for 
his own safety working on and about cars which have been 
delivered by a railroad. This rule applies even though the 
railroad company itself was negligent in not inspecting or 
failing to discover a d~fect in the ca·r or load that if should 
have, or, having discovered the same, in failing to notify 
the consignee by placarding the car with a bad order card. 
In the Raymond case the plaintiff was an experienced 
switchman who rode a gondola car loaded with scrap iron 
into a coupling with a standing car and was injured as a 
result of placing his hand inside the gondola. When the · 
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car came into impact with the standing car some of the 
scrap fell on the plaintiff's hand. The plaintiff knew from 
his experience as a switchman that it was a dangerous 
thing for a man to put any part of his body inside a loaded 
gondola while it was in motion. The trial court granted 
a nonsuit on the grounds that the evidence showed the 
plaintiff to have been guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law. This court unanimously affirmed, and said : 
"The obvious truth from plaintiff's own testi-
mony is that he gave no thought to his own safety. 
He placed his hand in a position which he knew to 
be dangerous when there was a safe method open 
to him. The court below correctly held that plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law." 
The court in this decision attached considerable importance 
to the fact that the plaintiff Raymond was an experienced 
switchman. We submit that the plaintiff Stickle, an ex-
perienced steel man, experienced in unloading this very 
type of shipment, obviously "gave no thought to his own 
safety." 
In a very early case decided by this court, Smith v. 
Rio Grande Western Railway Co., et al., 27 Utah 307, 75 
P. 749, it was held that the personal representatives of an 
employe of a consignee were not entitled to recover for his 
death occasioned by a defective brake on a car delivered 
by the defendant where he had failed to exercise ordinary 
care for his own safety. The defendant had delivered the 
car with a defective brake, the defect being such that it 
was readily observable upon the most casual inspection. 
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Plaintiff's duty was to loosen the brakes on the car left 
by the railroad company at a distance from the ore house, 
allowing them to move downgrade, and stopping them by 
means of the brake. He lost control of the cars, they ran 
away, and he was killed. He had failed to follow the in-
structions of his employer as to the method of dropping 
the cars and had given no attention to the condition of 
the brake, which the court says was "obviously very de-
fective." In holding the deceased guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, the court said: 
"It is plainly indicated b.y the evidence that de-
ceased made no effort to discover an open peril. 
* * * The conclusion, from the evidence, is ir-
resistable that the lamentable misfortune was the 
result of his own heedlessness. * * * Such be-
ing the case the tortious acts or negligence of the 
railroad company, if it was guilty of any, cannot 
be made the basis of a recovery for injuries result-
ing from the wrong or negligence of the deceased." 
In the case of Southern Pacific Co. vs. Edwards, 44 
F. 2d 526, the plaintiff, an employe of a consignee, was . 
preparing to unload some poles from a flatcar. The load 
was retained in the customary manner by stakes set up-
right in the stake pockets along the side of the flatcar. 
Wires were then fastened to the tops of the stakes and run 
across the top of the load. The load in question was leaning 
10 or 12 inches to one side. The plaintiff, following the 
customary practice, cut the wires on the stakes but did so 
while standing on the side of the car toward which the load 
was leaning. As a result the poles fell upon him. The 
court held that such conduct on his part constituted con-
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tributary negligence as a matter of law. In this case no 
notice of the condition of the load had been given to the 
plaintiff or his employer. The court said that under the 
circumstances no notice was necessary and in holding plain-' 
tiff guilty ·of contributory negligence as a matter of law 
said: 
"We are aware of no valid reason for holding 
a carrier is under a duty to give notice or warning 
of a condition which is so visible that any danger 
therefrom must be apparent to and appreciated by a 
person of ordinary intelligence, prudence and exper-
ience who undertakes the unloading .of a car." 
In the case of North Dakota v. Great Northern Rail-
way Co., 155 F. 2d 1005, the court affirmed a judgment 
directing a verdict for the defendant upon the grounds that 
the railroad was non-negligent and that plaintiff was him-
self guilty as a matter of law of contributory negligence. 
While fu"ny recognizing the duty of the delivering carrier 
the court had this to say about the duty of the plaintiff, 
who was an employe of the consignee: 
"The evidence was without dispute that the con-
dition of the door was apparent to one who looked 
at it. * * * Defendant was not an insurer of 
the safety of plaintiff and had a right to assume 
that this man of mature years and wide experience 
would, while on defendant's property, exercise ordi-
nary care for his own safety and it cannot be charged 
with negligence for its failure to anticipate that 
plaintiff· would not exercise such care. One is not 
under the duty of anticipating negligence on the 
part of others who have reached the age of maturity 
and are in possession of all their physical and mental 
faculties, but is entitled to assume and to act on 
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the assumption that others will exercise ordinary 
care for their own safety. Speaking of the duty to 
exercise ordinary care, we said in St. Mary's Hos-
pital v. Scanlon, 71 F. 2d 739: 'This duty is lim-
ited by the rule that no one is required to guard 
against or take measures to avert that which a rea-
sonably prudent person under the circumstances 
would not anticipate as likely to happen.' " 
While the above discussion by the court concerns the duty 
of the defendant principally, it forcibly asserts the settled 
principle of law that an employe of a consign~e must ex-
ercise ordinary care for his own safety in unloading a rail-
road car, and emphasizes that such duty exists apart from 
and without any con-sideration of the negligence or non-
negligence of the delivering carrier. 
Throughout appellant's brief it seems to us that there 
has been an attempt to qualify and mi:dimize the duty that 
plaintiff had to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, 
by emphasizing and enlarging the duty the defendant as 
a delivering carrier owed to the consignee and its employes. 
Counsel for appellant at page 12 of the brief says the plain-
tiff had "no duty to inspect", and that he "had no required 
duty to look." While admitting on page 15 of the brief 
that the defect in the strap could be found by looking at 
it, counsel for the appellant says that this "does not mean 
that plaintiff was guilty of negligence because he did not 
see it." He says- that it was the duty of the defendant rail-
road to see it, but not the duty of the plaintiff to see it. 
Appellant throughout his brief seems to imply that because 
he and his foreman knew that railroads inspected cars be-
fore delivery to consignees he was relieved of all duty of 
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making any examination himself, that is, relieved of ·any 
duty of exercising ordinary care for his own safety. Ap-
pellant's counsel says that plaintiff's task was to "use the 
strap" and "not to inspect it." Such arguments seem to us 
to be without any validity and certainly fail to relieve the 
plaintiff of the duty he had to exercise reasonable care for 
his own safety. No conduct on the part of the defendant 
releases plaintiff from this responsibility. It simply comes 
back to what was said by Mr. Justice Wolfe in the Raymond 
case, supra: 
"The right to have a jury pass upon issues of 
fact does not include the right to have a cause sub-
mitted to a jury in the hope of a verdict where the 
facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is not en-
titled to relief." 
And quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the case of John-
son v. U. S., 68 S. Ct. 391, 394, this court went on to say: 
"So long as liability is dependent upon proof 
of fault on the part of the defendant, and freedom 
from fault on the part of plaintiff, 'it is not for 
this court to torture and twist the law of negligence 
so as to make it in result a law not of liability for 
fault, but a law of liability for injuries.' " 
The trial court was amply warranted in directing a 
verdict upon the grounds that the evidence in this case dis-
closed as a matter of law that the plaintiff was himself 
guilty of negligence proximately contributing to his in-
juries. 
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POINT III. 
THERE W .A.S NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
INTRODUCED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT FAILE.D TO RE-
PAIR OR TO G~VE WARNING OF THE BROK-
EN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO WOULD 
UNLOAD THE TANKS FROM THE F'LATCAR. 
The duty of the defendant in part was to make a rea-
sonable inspection to discover any defects in the car or 
load that might cause harm to a person exercising ordinary 
care for his own safety. (Raymond v. Union Pacific; Smith 
v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co.; Southern Pac. Co. v. Ed-
wards; North Dakota v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra). 
The further duty of the delivering carrier we admit is to 
repair such defect or to notify the consignee thereof. It is 
important to recognize that the carrier may either repair 
or notify the consignee of the defect if it chooses, and if 
it does either it has discharged all the duty imposed by law. 
Erie R. Co. v. Murphy, 108 F. 2d 817; 
Sykes v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 178 Mo. 693, 
77 s. w. 723; 
Roy v. Georgia Ry. & Banking Co., (17 Ga. App. 
34), 86 S. E. 328. 
And see cases in the Annotation 126 A. L. R. 1095, where 
the decisions specifically decide the point or assume it to 
be the settled law in writing the decisions. 
But the duty to notify exists only where the defect or 
its potentialities for harm would not be evident to a less 
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experienced person, which necessarily follows from the rule 
that the delivering carrier has no duty to warn of a defect 
that is readily apparent to an ordinary person exercising 
due care for his own safety. 
We earnestly say to this court that the defect in the 
tie band-"readily observable" by plaintiff's own testimony 
had he lpoked at it before he used it to pull himself UP-
was such that had the defendant not discovered it or, dis-
covering it, failed to give notice thereof, it would not as 
a matter of law constitute negligence. The defendant's 
duty is limited by the rule that it has a right to assume 
others will exercise ordinary care for their own safety. 
No delivering carrier is required to anticipate and guard 
against and take measures to avert the consequences of a 
failure on the part of the consignee or his employes to 
exercise ordinary care for their own safety. The defendant 
is not an insurer of its own employes, much less those of 
its consignees. There is no duty to make loads "accident 
proof." (Cases supra). 
Be that. as it may, what did the defendant do towards 
discharging its responsibility to the consignee in this case? 
We ·think the defendant went beyond the requirements of 
the law in the discharge of'its duty. It made the inspection, 
it discovered the defect and it gave notice by bad ordering 
the car. A greater display of care and responsibility would 
scarcely be possible in view of the nature of the railroad 
business. And the law requires· no more. 
Appellant says at page 26 of his· brief that, "One of the 
witnesses for the defendant company testified that bad or-
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dered cars should go to the repair track and a car with a 
broken tie band, such as the car in question, should have 
been sent to the rip track to be repaired." The witnesses 
who testified on this point clearly testified to the contrary. 
The general car foreman, Mr. Peters, testified that the 
partciular car in question if safe for transportation would 
in conformity with the custom be delivered to the consignee. 
He was asked, 
"Q. And would that kind of a load go to the 
rip track or the repair track before it was being 
moved? 
"A. No sir" (Tr. 87). 
Although he was subjected to a vigorous cross-examination 
on the point he did not in the least deviate from his testi-
mony that the particular ca:r: in question would i:ri view of 
the type of defect involved be delivered to the consignee. 
Counsel may be referring to the testimony of the witness 
Cutler upon cross-examination. But this witness also on 
direct testified as follows: 
"Q. If you. find a defect in the load, such as a 
broken tie band, and it appears to you that the car 
can be moved without safety to the customer, is that 
what you do with it? 
"A. Yes sir. 
THE COURT: You mean with safety, 
don't you? 
"Q. I mean with safety. 
"A. Yes sir. 
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"Q. And in the twenty -seven years that you 
have worked there in Pocatello has that been ·the 
custom? 
"A. Yes sir" (Tr. 74). 
And on redirect he testified as follows: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Roberts in questioning you, 
when he was questioning you, you said that ordinar-
ily if a car is bad ordered it goes to the rip track 
for repairs? · 
"A. Yes sir, that's right. 
"Q. Now ·suppose that there is a defect in the 
load which is considered safe to transport to some-
one right there in the city, as distinguished from 
going out on the line to the next town. What do you 
do with that car? 
"A. Ordinarily they just let it go to the place 
that it is going to be unloaded if it is safe to go that 
far. A tie band,· that would be safe to travel to 
where it is going to be unloaded. 
"Q. And would you consider this, a flat car 
loaded with two tanks with say, two tie bands on 
each one, one of which was broken, with the tanks 
sitting in wooden cradles, would be safe to move 
those within the city, from the inspection point to 
the customer? 
"A. Yes sir. Yes sir, they would be safe. 
"Q. Well then, you wouldn't send that kind of 
a load to the rip track, would you? 
"A. No sir" (Tr. 81, 82). 
We are not forgetting that the appellant says there 
was sufficient evidence of a failure to put a bad order card 
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on the car as to warrant submitting to the jury the ques-
tion of defendant's negligence. This presupposes the defect 
to be one that required notice, a defect that could not be 
discovered by the exercise of ordinary care, which we are 
unwilling to admit. As to the evidence of failure to give 
notice, the defendant produced the Association of American 
Railroads original inspection records signed by the witness 
Cutler, car inspector on the job when the car went through. 
The specific defect "broken tie band" was noted thereon 
(Tr. 73, 7 4). The witness Cutler, who for 27 years had 
been performing his job adequately it can be presumed, said 
that although he had no recollection of the car independent 
of the record, he was willing to say that he did staple a 
bad order card on the car which bore a notation of the 
specific defect "broken tie band" (Tr. 72). We ask the 
court to consider the handicap the witness was under when 
asked if he had an independent recollection of placarding 
the car. There is no evidence as to when the defendant 
learned that plaintiff considered it responsible for the ac-
cident. Suit was not instituted until the lapse of more than 
twenty months. Plaintiff was not an employe of defendant. 
It isn't that we ask the court without any basis to assume 
the defendant did not learn of the accident until such a 
lapse of time that ~ur car inspector could not honestly re-
member placarding the particular car in question. The 
defendant had no reason to have an investigation file of an 
accident that it did not know concerned it, or to talk to the 
car inspector at a time so close to the event that he might -
have an independent recollection thereof. Such facts are 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from all the evi-
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dence in the case. Against this, the appellant says the testi-
mony of the plaintiff and his foreman that they "did not 
-
see a bad order card" is sufficient to make a jury question 
on the issues of whether the defendant gave notice by plac-
arding the car. In spite of the fact that plaintiff and his 
foreman testified they were familiar with the use of bad 
order cards, would not work on a car carrying such a card 
until they ascertained they could do so in safety (Tr. 96, 
97) , they nevertheless by their own admissions made no 
inspection or examination of the car whatever, to determine 
whether it carried a bad order card or was safe to unload 
in the manner they were going to unload it (Tr. 96, 97, 98). 
As to inspection, the plaintiff Stickle himself said he made 
"none whatsoever'' (Tr. 39). The record we believe is such 
as warranted direction of a verdict of no cause of action 
on the non-negligence of the defendant alone. The defect 
was so apparent as not to require notice to one exercising 
ordinary reasonable care for his own safety. But if it be 
thought otherwise, the, statement by plaintiff that he did 
not see what he did not look for, is not the kind of evi-
dence that raises an issue of fact upon which the minds of 
reasonable men might differ. 
It may be thought that placing a bad order card on a 
car and noting the specific defect thereon is insufficient 
notice. The evidence discloses that the practice and custom 
of defendant at Pocatello for 27 years had been to serve 
notice of bad order cars only in such manner (Tr. 73, 7 4) . 
That such custom and practice prevailed elsewhere on de-
fendant's line of railroad (Tr. 86, 87, 89, 90). That the 
custom and practice is a reasonable one, a practical and 
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almost necessary one cannot be questioned. If a car is safe 
for transportation to a local industry, the exigencies of the 
business require that it be sent to the consignee with a bad 
order card placed thereon notifying of the defect. The law 
permits such handling in connection with the load without 
imposing liability on the delivering carrier for injuries 
sustained by the consignee or his employes. Otherwise, the 
car would have to be diverted to the repair track and wait 
its turn for repairs. In this case it would have meant 
putting on a new tie band that would be cut with a torch 
as soon as consignee got the load. Not only an unnecessary 
tie-up of railroad equipment would result, but consignees 
themselves would strenuously object to such delay to their 
shipments. Delays such as this would cause untold unnec-
essary expense to business and industry. Railroads can be 
held liable in damages for unnecessary delays. The law 
should be useful and practical while protecting individual 
rights, and in this instance wisely approves the custom and 
practice of notifying consignees of defects in loads by bad 
order tags. On the very last page of appellant's brief he 
quotes from Erie R. Co. v. Murphy, (supra) as follows: 
"* * * Though the evidence was conflicting 
as to whether an inspector should have carded a car 
as unsafe or defective under the circumstances here 
presented, there was substantial evidence * * * ." 
indicating an assumption that placing a bad order card on 
a car is sufficient form. of notice. 
In North Dakota v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 155 F. 2d 
1005, the plaintiff, a grain inspec~or employed by a com-
pany other than the defendant railroad, went to the repair 
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track to inspect the grain in a car that had been bad or-
dered. He was given a list of all cars that had been sent 
to the repair track and knew the car in question had been 
bad ordered. The defendant railroad had put a bad order 
card on the door and had written thereon "door out at top". 
'The defect was readily observable and the danger inherent 
in the defect was apparent. A fellow-employe removed the 
seal and the· door fell on the plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals said : 
"* * * the evidence was without dispute 
that the condition of the door was apparent to one 
who looked at it. With warning that the car was 
in bad order, and invitee was put on his guard, and 
the bad order card showed that the car was in bad 
order." 
The court held there was no substantial proof of negligence 
on the part of the defendant railroad and affirmed a di-
rected verdict. 
· Appellant seems to suggest that even though it be as-
sumed the car in question was bad ordered there was a jury 
question as to whether defendant ought to have done more. 
He cites no authority for such a proposition, and we have 
found none, recognizing such an extension of a carrier's 
responsibility. The cases cited above indicate otherwise. 
In view of. the plaintiff's special knowledge and experience 
with the type ·of load in question, there is nothing what-
ever to suggest the defendant had a duty to do more than 
follow the customary practice of placing a bad order card 
on the car. Without specifically deciding the question of 
what constitutes notice the cases, as do those cited above, 
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all show an assumption by the courts that the duty to notify 
is com plied "ri th by placing a bad order tag on the car. 
There were no special circumstances in the case at bar re-
quiring more. The defendant is not charged with the bur-
den of knowing the precise details of the method a con-
signee may choose to use in unloading. There is no proof 
that defendant knew or ought to· have known a man would 
use the tie band to pull himself to the top of the car. Plain-
tiff's own evidence was that just as frequently th~ man 
went up the crane. A ladder or other means might just 
as well, and perhaps with greater safety, be employed. The 
defect was not such that any person would have observed 
it and failed to appreciate the danger in putting it to the 
use plaintiff did. And plaintiff was specially skilled and 
experienced in unloading such tanks. We submit that a bad 
1111111111111 order card was sufficient notice, if indeed notice was re-
quired at all. 
In passing, it might be noticed that the plaintiff never 
charged in the complaint (Tr. 2, 3), that the defendant 
failed to give notice or proper notice and has never amended. · 
so as to make an issue thereof. 
We think the evidence of the defendant's negligence is 
insufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury. 
First, for the reason that the defendant does not have a 
duty to repair or give notice of a defect in a load where 
the defect and its potentialities for causing harm are read-
ily apparent to anyone undertaking to unload the car and 
exercising care for his own safety. The admission of the 
plaintiff and the undisputed evidence is that the defect was 
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readily apparent to anyone that looked, and not only to one 
skilled and experienced with this very type of load. Sec-
ondly, the statement by plaintiff that he did not see what 
he did not look for-the bad order card-is insufficient in 
view of defendant's inspection, discovery, record of defect, 
universal practice of bad ordering such cars, great lapse of 
time precluding an independent recollection of this particu-
lar car, to raise an issue upon which the minds of reason-
able men might differ. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the evidence in this case 
as a matter of law disclosed the negligence'--Of the plaintiff 
to be a proximate cause, if not the sole cause, of the acci-
dent and his injuries, and failed as a matter of law to raise 
any question substantial enough to warrant submission of 
the defendant's negligence to a jury. Unless the defend-
ant is an insurer, unless the law is "a law of liability for 
injuries" and nothing I more, we think the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
MARVIN J. BERT'OCH, 
Counsel for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Ut~h 
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